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Abstract
Using survey vignettes and scaling techniques, we estimate common socio-cultural
and European integration dimensions for political parties across the member states of
the European Union. Previous research shows that economic left/right travels well
across the EU, meaning that the placements of parties on that dimension are cross-
nationally comparable; however, the social dimension is more complex, with different
issues forming the core of the social dimension in different countries. The 2014 wave
of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey includes anchoring vignettes which we use as “bridge
votes” to place parties from different countries on a common social liberal/authoritarian
dimension and a separate common scale for European integration. We estimate the
dimensions using the Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey technique. The resulting scales offer
cross-nationally comparable interval-level measures of a party’s social and EU ideolog-
ical positions.
Expert surveys are an increasingly common tool for measuring latent concepts in the compar-
ative social sciences (Norris, Frank, and Mart´ınez i Coma 2014; Lindberg et al. 2014; Teorell,
Dahlstro¨m, and Dahlberg 2011). One of the most prominent uses of expert surveys has been
to obtain information on the policy positions of political parties in contemporary democra-
cies (Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010; McElroy and Benoit 2010; Rohrschneider
and Whitefield 2012; Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017).
A central concern about the expert survey approach to estimating party positions pertains to
the cross-national comparability of respondent placements (Budge 2000; McDonald, Mendes,
and Kim 2007). If experts for each country place only the parties within a single party
system, can we be sure that respondents for France conceive of and use a particular scale
in the same way as their colleagues that complete a survey for the parties of Lithuania? At
a time when party government faces representational challenges from both populism and
technocratic management (Caramani 2017) and other analysts speak of a crisis of party
democracy (Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein 2017), it becomes all the more pressing to
understand the comparability of fundamental measures in widely used data on party politics.
Prior research combined ‘blackbox’ scaling techniques (Poole 1998) with a series of anchoring
vignettes (King et al. 2004; King and Wand 2007) embedded within the 2010 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey to show that expert placements of political parties on the economic left-
right dimension are cross-nationally comparable across Europe (citation withheld). Yet, we
also know that politics in many contemporary European democracies is multidimensional,
and that a “second” dimension is an important determinant of public opinion and party
competition on issues such as immigration and European integration (Hooghe and Marks
2009; Bornschier 2010; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Kriesi et al. 2012; Rovny 2014; Ha¨usermann
and Kriesi 2015; Hobolt and de Vries 2015). As challenger parties that emphasize this cultural
dimension become more prominent across the continent (Hobolt and Tilley 2016), we require
a deeper understanding of the cross-national comparability of this more complex dimension
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in today’s politics.
In addition to the social dimension, European integration has taken on increasing political
importance, as the financial crisis and migration challenges have made clear (Bechtel, Hain-
mueller, and Margalit 2014; Copelovitch, Frieden, and Walter 2016). And although recent
scholarship suggests that citizens perceive party shifts on European integration (Adams,
Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2014), we still know less about the cross-national comparability
of the European integration dimension. In short, while there is growing evidence that the
left-right dimension “travels well” for expert survey respondents (citation withheld), it re-
mains unclear if this is the case for other prominent dimensions of political competition in
contemporary European societies.
We argue that this cross-national comparability of party positions on the prominent dimen-
sions is of increasing importance for social scientists. A transnational model of European
party competition is currently underdeveloped, but several features of European politics
point in this direction. First, there is strong evidence that party policy diffuses across na-
tional borders, with parties learning from and adapting to successful strategies in neighboring
countries (Bo¨hmelt et al. 2016). Second, after the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections,
the Spitzenkandidat—“lead candidate” of the EP group—receiving the plurality of the vote
was elected as the President of the European Commission (Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa 2015).
And although the effect of this new method of selecting the leader of the Commission may
have been limited and somewhat polarizing, this form of transnational party competition
will likely remain a feature of subsequent EP elections (Hobolt 2014; Popa, Rohrschneider,
and Schmitt 2016). Third, the organization of EP groups and switching between groups is
largely driven by questions of policy congruence between the national and transnational lev-
els (McElroy and Benoit 2010). Finally, there is growing discussion of replacing the British
seats in the European Parliament with a transnational list after the United Kingdom leaves
the European Union, which would substantially advance forms of political competition that
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require additional information about the cross-national comparability of party positions.
This paper addresses questions of cross-national comparability for social left-right and Euro-
pean integration by combining anchoring vignettes embedded in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES) on party positions in Europe with Bayesian scaling techniques based on the
work of Aldrich and McKelvey (Aldrich and McKelvey 1977; Hare et al. 2015). Comparing
the rank orderings of political parties in the raw and adjusted data, we demonstrate that,
on the whole, there are few significant changes in ordering. This finding suggests that all
three dimensions as measured by expert surveys are cross-nationally comparable. Using both
the raw and rescaled measures, we replicate a prominent study on the relationship between
economic left-right, social left-right, and party positions on European integration (Marks
et al. 2006). We report that the central findings of that article hold when using either the
raw or rescaled data from 12 years later, lending confidence to both those original findings
and also the 2014 CHES data on party positions.
1 CHES meets Bayesian Aldrich McKelvey
The 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positions in Europe is the most recent wave in
an ongoing research project designed to measure the positions of political party leadership
on dimensions and policies related to the economy, socio-cultural matters, and European
integration (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017). 337 political scientists
that study political parties and/or European integration completed the survey, and all 28
EU members, plus Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, were included in the 2014 round. This
produced information for a total of 268 political parties in Europe.
Each expert respondent placed the parties of only one party system, which creates some
uncertainty as to whether or not the expert respondents use the various policy scales in
comparable ways across countries. In order to address this concern, the survey included a
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series of anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2004; King and Wand 2007; citation withheld). This
vignette section described the positions of three hypothetical parties for three dimensions:
economic left-right, social left-right, and European integration.1 Unlike the majority of the
survey, every CHES respondent had the opportunity to place these hypothetical parties on
the same three scales, and these placements can then be used as bridging information to
facilitate comparison of the respondents’ other placements.
When survey respondents in different contexts answer the same survey questions, there is
the potential that these respondents have different interpretations of the response categories.
This is especially true when the response categories represent relative positions on a latent
scale, such as left-right ideology. Differential-item functioning (DIF) occurs when the un-
derlying scale is interpreted differently across a range of respondents. DIF can lead to a
distortion of the placements of stimuli (i.e., political parties) on a given scale. For example,
a British party expert and a Greek party expert may view the end points of a pro/anti
EU integration scale in different ways, confounding the ability to compare parties’ positions
across countries.
In the late 1970s, Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) developed an estimation technique aimed
at correcting DIF in perception/placement scales. Their solution, Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
(henceforth A-M), assumes that there exists a true placement for a given stimuli (i.e. party)
and that any individual placement of a stimuli is actually a linear distortion of this true
placement. The A-M solution allows each survey respondent to have her own ‘distortion’
parameters, while treating the true placement of a stimuli as fixed across all respondents.
The distortion parameters act in such a way as to allow different respondents to shift the true
placement to the left or right and/or to expand or contract distances between placements
on the underlying scale.
A-M takes advantage of the fact that survey respondents in their data all place the same set
1Online Appendix A provides the wording of the vignettes.
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of stimuli as well as placing themselves on an ideological left-right scale. This combination
of information allows for estimation of the individual distortion parameters and results in a
scale in which the placements of the respondents and stimuli are meaningfully comparable.
We take advantage of this insight and employ a Bayesian version of this estimator to compare
placements of political parties in different countries, where the placements are derived from
country-specific respondents. As long as all of the respondents place at least one common
stimuli, the solution to this problem is relatively straightforward.
As much of an innovation as A-M scaling represents in terms of overcoming problems with
DIF, there are some serious limitations. Most notably for our purposes, A-M scaling does
not allow for missing data when deriving a cross-contextually comparable scale. This is
quite problematic as the CHES asks country-specific experts to place parties on a variety
of dimensions, but only in the a single country. That is, British experts place only British
parties and Greek experts place only Greek parties. When all of these country-specific data
are combined, the resulting data matrix contains huge amounts of missing data, as British
experts do not place Greek parties, etc. With this structure to our data, classic A-M scaling
is not an option. A second limitation is that classic A-M scaling does not yield estimates of
uncertainty for the estimated stimuli positions, which makes it impossible to discern whether
or not two different candidates/parties are statistically distinguishable from one another on
some dimension.
In order to overcome these limitations, we use the Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey (BAM) scal-
ing procedure developed in Hare et al. (2015). In that paper, the authors place senators,
candidates for the Senate, and survey respondents on a common ideological scale. Their
data are strikingly similar to ours in that only respondents from a senator’s/candidate’s
state place that senator/candidate, which leads to an abundance of missingness in the final
data set. The survey used by Hare et al. (2015) also asked respondents to place President
Obama, the Democratic and Republican parties, and the Tea Party on the same ideological
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scale that they were placing their state-specific Senate candidates. So, while respondents in
two different states placed different senators/candidates from one another, all respondents
placed the president and the parties. These common stimuli act as ‘bridging’ votes and are
the key to developing a cross-contextually comparable scale.
As described above, the 2014 wave of the CHES includes anchoring vignettes that we use as
bridge votes to construct a cross-nationally comparable scale. The Bayesian implementation
of A-M scaling easily handles the missing data in our model as missing values are auto-
matically imputed via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). MCMC also directly produces
measures of uncertainty that reflect both variance in the observed placements of parties as
well as the degree of missingness for a given party. This yields larger standard errors for
parties with fewer observed placements.
The BAM model closely resembles a Bayesian factor model, with the primary distinction
being how the parameters and the latent variable are indexed. The factor model assumes
that there is some latent variable, X, that is specific to a given respondent and that this
latent variable is related to observable indicators through parameters (often called factor
loadings) that are indexed by the observed indicators. In the BAM model, this indexing is
reversed. This means that the the latent variable X is indexed by the observable indicator
and the parameters in the mode by respondent. For our data, this translates to the position
of a party on a specific dimension Xj, where j indexes party, being related to an expert’s
placement of that party yij, where i indexes expert, through parameters αi and βi. Following
the above discussion α and β are the distortion parameters that map the expert’s perception
of a party’s placement onto the ‘true’ position of that party.
To be Bayesian, we must specify distributional assumptions for the unknown quantities in
the model. We must also specify the distribution of the dependent variables, in this case the
expert placements of the parties, yij. As these placements are 11 point scales, we assume
them to be normally distributed with an estimated mean and variance. We then set the
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mean position of expert i’s placement of party j to be equal to the the true position of party
j, Xj, as well as the parameters αi and βi. Formally, the model is:
yij ∼ N(µij, τij)
µij = αi + βiXj
The unknown quantities, α, β, and X require prior distributions in the Bayesian setup. For
this model, we specify uniform priors for α and β and a standard Normal prior for X.
Following Hare et al. (2015), we allow the variance of the expert placements to be a function
of both expert and party, τi and τj, with the total variance in yij being the product of these
2 terms. Both the expert and the party variance terms are drawn from diffuse conjugate
Gamma distributions. Formally:
αi ∼ Uniform(−100, 100)
βi ∼ Uniform(0, 100)
Xj ∼ N(0, 1)
τij = τiτj
τj ∼ Gamma(1, .1)
τi ∼ Gamma(ν, ω)
ν ∼ Gamma(0.1, 0.1)
ω ∼ Gamma(0.1, 0.1)
In order to identify the model and to set the scale of the latent variable, we constrain the βs
to be positive. This assures that higher values of the latent variable, X, are associated with
higher values of the expert placements. Substantively, this means for the economic and social
left-right dimensions, higher values of the latent variable indicate more right-wing positions
whereas for the EU dimension, higher values of the latent variable represent a more pro-
EU position. As an additional identification constraint, we specified prior positions for the
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vignette party placements that respects the intended ordering of the vignette placements.
This is what King et al. (2004) refer to as vignette equivalence and is a requirement of
anchoring vignette-based scaling. That is, in order to be included in the model, experts
must correctly perceive the ordering of the vignette parties. We require that each party be
placed by at least 3 experts in order to be included in the estimation. With these restrictions,
we are able to produce a cross-nationally comparable scale for the economic left-right, social
left-right, and pro/anti-EU integration dimension for 249 parties based on the input of 337
experts. We estimated the model using JAGS via the R package rjags. For each dimension,
we ran two chains for 20, 000 iterations, discarding the first 5, 000 as a burn-in. The chains
show strong evidence of convergence across a variety of diagnostics.
After running the BAM procedure for each of the three dimensions for which we have vignette
placements, we then sample 1, 000 draws from the posterior distribution of each party’s
placement on each dimension. Figures 1 and 2 summarize these distributions graphically
by plotting the mean and 95% credible interval of each party’s distribution for the social
dimension, separating the dimension into two graphs in order to make reading the y-axis
labels easier.2
2The party names and abbreviations in Figures 1 and 2 can be found online at chesdata.eu in the 2014
codebook. In Online Appendix B, Figures B1 and B2 plot the left-leaning and right-leaning parties in
terms of economic positions while Figures B3 and B4 display the distributions of parties on the European
dimension.
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Party Placements with 95% Credible Intervals
Social Left−Right: left parties
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Figure 1: Social left-right
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Party Placements with 95% Credible Intervals
Social Left−Right: right parties
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Figure 2: Social left-right
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As Figures 1–2 illustrate, there is a great deal of variation across these parties in terms
of their positions on the social dimension.3 Yet, it is obviously important to examine the
rescaled data more carefully and test their performance in analysis, to which we now turn.
2 BAM vs. Raw
What meaningful differences, if any, exist between the raw and adjusted data? The corre-
lations between the raw and rescaled measures are very high, between 0.97 and 0.99. But
to explore this further, we sorted the data based on their rank orders on the two scales and
plotted these against each other. Thus, we created 2 new variables for each dimension that
range from 1 to 249, representing the lowest to highest values on each dimension. Next, we
plot these two sets of rank orders against each other. If there were no differences in the rank
orders between the BAM solution and the unscaled expert placements, the points would fall
in a straight 45 degree line. To the extent that the rank orders differ, the points diverge
from the ‘perfect’ fit. Figure 3 displays these comparisons for the social dimension.4
3Parties with particularly large credible intervals tend to be those that were placed by smaller numbers
of experts.
4Figures C1 and C2 in Online Appendix C display these comparisons for economic left-right and the
European integration.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Social left-right rank orders
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In this plot, we highlight (with diamonds) parties that differ in rank ordering between the
two scales by at least two standard deviations. These plots show that while there are some
differences in the rank ordering of the parties across the two scales, for a majority of the
parties in the data, these differences are not very large. It is particularly remarkable that
the difference between the raw and adjusted data is so small for the social dimension, which
contradicts our expectations given the complexity of this dimension relative to economic left-
right and variation in its content from country to country. Yet, perhaps the small difference
between the raw and rescaled social dimension reflects the growing importance of questions
surrounding immigration, a core issue for this dimension in most if not all countries, and the
clarity of party messages on migration.
As an additional test of the raw vs. rescaled measures, we replicated a prominent paper
(Marks et al. 2006), which models support for European integration in 2002 using the eco-
nomic and social dimensions. In online Appendix D, we used the rescaled dimensionality
measures created in this paper to replicate and extend this earlier study of party-based Eu-
roskepticism. This replication supports the key finding in that paper, namely that ideological
extremism is still a crucial factor to consider. It is also striking that the raw and rescaled
data perform rather similarly in these models, which lends confidence to users of the raw
CHES scores.
3 Discussion
In this paper, we combined a series of anchoring vignettes that depicted hypothetical political
parties with Bayesian scaling techniques to produce cross-nationally comparable economic
left-right, social left-right, and European integration positions for a wide range of political
parties in Europe. There was already growing theoretical and empirical evidence that the
economic left-right dimension travelled well across Europe . The findings we report in this
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paper indicate that party positions on social left-right and European integration also show
a strikingly high degree of pan-European comparability. That is, the Bayesian Aldrich-
McKelvey scaling solution produces a cross-contextually comparable measure and given that
the raw expert party positions are so closely related to the rescaled party positions, we are
ever more confident in the cross-national comparability of our experts placements. This is
important information, both because these dimensions makes up an increasingly prominent
aspect of party competition in Europe, and because it suggests that the items included
in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys measure these dimensions effectively. For users of the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey data, these results provide more confidence in the cross-national
comparability and validity of the CHES party positions.
Our replication of a well-known study on the relationship between economic and social
ideology and European integration (Marks et al. 2006) further illustrates this point. Although
the research we replicated used unscaled party positions from 2002, we find a similar structure
to party positions on European integration in the 2014 raw and rescaled data. Party positions
on European integration are structured and are systematically related to ideology on the
economic and social left-right dimensions. In sum, the work that we present here supports
the cross-national comparability of key concepts for party competition in contemporary
European societies.
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